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EMPLOYEE EQUITY INCENTIVE PLANS FOR SMALL
COMPANIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIFIC
REGISTRATION EXEMPTION FROM THE 1933 ACT
Employee equity incentive plans have become a popular means of
attracting and compensating key employees who hold responsible manage-
rial, professional, and advisory positions with a company.' Employee equity
incentive arrangements range from outright stock sales at or below market
prices, to stock options, stock bonuses, and cash plans that a company
tailors to an employee's job performance. 2 Employee equity incentive plans
1. See The Conference Board, Top Executive Compensation 6-8 (1982 ed.) (prevalence
of equity incentive plans ranges from 81% for manufacturing companies to 20% for gas and
electric utilities); Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc., Long Term Incentive Compensation Plans,
at 1 (1982) (187 of 200 largest industrial companies have equity incentive plans for key
employees); see also Duke, Employee Stock Option Plans Under the Securities Act: A Time
for Reexamination, 38 Bus. LAw 1429, 1430-31 (1983) (examining typical equity incentive
plans); infra notes 10-38 and accompanying text (discussing common equity incentive plans
for small companies).
2. Duke, supra note 1, at 1430-31 & n.8. The employee equity incentive plans that
companies most often utilize generally fall into a familiar pattern. Id. Because of changing
federal income tax considerations, employee equity incentive plans contain various character-
istics that attempt to give the recipient favorable tax consequences. Id. Common examples of
employee equity incentives are incentive stock options ("ISOs"), stock appreciation tights
("SARs"), tax offsets, stock-for-stock exchanges, and limited cash-out tights. Id. An ISO is
an incentive stock option that, by meeting the requirements of § 422A of the Internal Revenue
Code, affords the recipient potentially favorable tax consequences when the recipient exercises
the option. I.R.C. § 422A (1986); see Duke, supra note I, at 1430-31 & n.8 (discussing ISOs
and tax consequences of ISOs); see also infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (discussing
ISOs in context of small companies' employee equity incentive plans). An SAR is a stock
appreciation right affording the recipient a method of realizing in cash or securities the
difference between the stock's market value and the stock's option price, without actually
exercising the underlying option. Id. The SAR holder, therefore, is able to obtain the fair
market value increase of the holder's stock without expending any additional funds. 2 R.
HAFT, VENTURE CAPrri. AND SMALL Busmass FiNANcINGs § 4.03 (1986); see infra note 25
(discussing small businesses use of SARs in connection with employee equity incentive plans).
A tax offset option provides that upon exercising a non-ISO stock option the recipient will
receive a cash payment to meet any tax liability that the recipient incurs when exercising the
non-ISO option. Duke, supra note 1, at n.8. A stock-for-stock exchange provides that upon
the recipient's exercise of the stock option, the recipient must surrender company stock that
the recipient already owns in full or partial payment of the option stock. Id. Finally, a limited
cash-out right provides the recipient with the ability to cash-out an option in case of an
unfriendly tender offer. Id. A limited cash-out right, therefore, allows the recipient to avoid
potential short-swing liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id;
see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). Under the short-swing
profit rules, any director or officer of a corporation who realizes a profit from the purchase
and sale of the company's stock within a six-month period must forfeit the profit to the
company. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). The 1934 Act's
concept of purchase and sale are broad, applying to an officer or director's rights to acquire
or dispose of the stock. Keller, Employee Equity Incentive Arrangements, REv. oF SEc. &
COM. REO. 156, 159 (Je. 25, 1986).
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are useful particularly to small, closely-held corporations,3 which often have
less cash available to attract, compensate, and retain key employees, and
which want to preserve capital for future business expansion.4 Present federal
securities laws and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") fail
to recognize the predominantly compensatory nature of employee equity
incentive plans.5 Consequently, the SEC requires companies utilizing em-
ployee equity incentive plans to comply with the present federal securities
laws and regulations that Congress and the SEC primarily have designed to
3. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578,
586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975) (defining closely-held corporation as corporation with small
number of shareholders who participate substantially in management and operations of
corporation and whose shares have no readily available market for resale).
4. See Keller, supra note 2, at 156 & 160 (discussing importance of equity incentive
plans to small businesses). Employee equity incentives provide small companies with the
attraction of equity growth for a prospective employee and enhance the company's ability to
recruit desired employees from a limited pool of candidates. Id at 156. While small companies
have a wide variety of employee equity incentive plans from which to choose to compensate
and motivate their key employees, the plans that small companies most commonly utilize are
plans using "restricted stock" subject to repurchase options or obligations; incentive stock
option plans receiving potentially favorable tax treatment for the recipient; nonqualified stock
option plans receiving ordinary tax treatment for the recipient; and, issuances of convertible
junior common stock subject to lesser rights and privileges for the recipient compared to the
company's ordinary common shareholders. See R. HAFr, supra note 2, at § 4.03 (discussing
employee stock option plans and stock appreciation rights). Incentive stock options (ISOs) are
stock options that a company offers to the company's employees to allow the employees to
purchase stock from the company at favorable prices. Id.; see infra notes 17-24 and accom-
panying text (discussing ISOs and tax consequences of ISOs); see also R. HAFr, supra note 2,
at § 4.03 (discussing nonqualified stock option plans); infra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text (same); R. HAFT, supra note 2, at § 4.04 (discussing junior common stock); infra notes
30-38 and accompanying text (same).
5. See Keller, supra note 2, at 156 & 160 (discussing importance of equity incentive
plans for small businesses). Stanley Keller, a practitioner specializing in small business formation
and financing, distinguishes an investment securities plan and a compensatory securities plan.
Id. at 156. The commentator defines an investment-oriented equity incentive plan as a stock
transaction, usually offered as part of a stock offering to outside investors, that a company
undertakes primarily as a means of generating operating capital. Id. These capital-raising stock
distributions, such as employee stock purchase plans, are primarily investment opportunities
for the recipient, and Keller maintains that the investor protection principles of the present
federal securities laws should continue to govern investment types of stock transactions. Id.
Keller contends that employees who participate in investment stock plans should continue
to have access to the financial and operational information that the current federal securities
laws require a company to disclose when offering securities to the public. Id.
In contrast to investment securities plans, Keller defines a compensatory stock plan as a
plan that a company undertakes primarily to benefit that company's employees. Id. Examples
of primarily compensatory plans are stock sales to employees below market prices, or favorable
stock options that require little or no cash investment by the employee. Id. While an employee
participating in such stock plans may be making an investment decision of a sort in deciding
to accept the securities offering in lieu of cash, the compensatory nature of these plans is
predominant. Id. Consequently, Keller argues that these plans do not require the protection
of the present federal securities laws, which Congress and the SEC have designed to affect
primarily companies' stock offerings to outside investors. Id. Because the current federal
security laws fail to recognize the compensatory nature of employee equity incentive plans,
Keller argues that the securities laws prevent small companies from using these compensatory
1130
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protect investors participating in capital-raising transactions. 6 Small com-
panies that want to implement an employee equity incentive plan, therefore,
must pay the high cost of registering the securities of the company's
employee equity incentive plan with the SEC, or alternatively, attempt to
manipulate the employee equity incentive plan to fall within either a regis-
tration exemption or the "no sale" concept of the Securities Act of 1933
("1933 Act" or "Act"). 7 Small companies, however, by relying on the
present registration exemptions or the "no sale" concept, often violate the
1933 Act inadvertently when implementing an employee equity incentive
plan and risk sanctions from the SEC.' Because of the present dilemma
plans effectively. Id.
Similarly, another commentator, Robert Duke, senior vice president and general counsel
of Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., has recognized a distinction between employee stock option plans,
which are compensatory, and employee stock purchase plans, which are investment-oriented.
See Duke, supra note 1, at 1433-34 (discussing economic difference between stock option and
stock purchase plans). Duke maintains that while companies normally use stock option plans
to provide incentives to key employees in achieving high performance with their company,
companies normally use stock purchase plans as an equity capital source. Id. at 1434 n.23.
The commentator indicates that corporate issuers, anxious to make the stock option plan an
effective incentive, ordinarily go to considerable lengths to explain the relevant legal and tax
aspects of these options to their employees. Id. at 1435. The commentator argues that because
companies -supply their employees with information concerning the companies' stock option
similar to the information that the federal securities laws require the company to disclose, the
SEC should exempt these plans from registration. Id. at 1434; see infra note 40 and accom-
panying text (discussing SEC's securities registration process and principles that underlie
securities registration).
6. Keller, supra note 2, at 160; see infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing
registration process for employee equity incentive plans).
7. See Keller, supra note 2, at 156 (discussing securities registration options for companies
instituting equity incentive plans); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982); see
also infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing costs of securities registration for employee
equity incentive plans); notes 48-125 and accompanying text (discussing 1933 Act's registration
exemptions and "no sale" concept).
8. Keller, supra note 2, at 160. Deficiencies in a company's registration materials or a
company's failure to register its securities offering can result in administrative action by the
SEC, criminal sanctions, and civil liability. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcuRrrsS REGULATION §
7.1 (1985). The SEC possesses the statutory authority to deny, suspend the effective date of,
suspend for the period of a year, or withdraw the registration of a security because of a
company's failure to comply with any provision of the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(2)
(1982) (delineating sanctions available to SEC in reprimanding companies that fail to comply
with 1933 Act); 3 H. BLoolENmTna, Scturrms AND FEDERAL CoRuoRATE LAw § 3.1912] (1986
rev.) (discussing sanctions that SEC commonly uses to discipline companies that fail to comply
with registration requirements of 1933 Act).
Additionally, the SEC has the authority to suspend summarily any security from trading
in both the exchange and over-the-counter markets. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(4) (1982); H. BLOOm-
ENTHAL, supra, at § 3.1913]. Another means that the SEC employs to encourage compliance
with the 1933 Act's registration requirements is criminal sanctions. H. BLOOMENrHAL, supra,
at § 3.19[1]. Under the 1934 Act, any willful failure to file a registration statement or the
willful use of false or misleading statements on a registration statement is a criminal offense
punishable by a possible two-year imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982).
The SEC possesses the authority to refer appropriate cases to the United States Justice
1987] 1131
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concerning the registration obligations of small companies desiring to insti-
tute employee equity incentive plans, the SEC should adopt a specific
registration exemption under which small companies can forego the expen-
sive registration process with more certainty than present federal securities
laws afford. 9
Small companies often implement employee equity incentive plans in
which the company issues restricted stock to the company's key employees.' 0
A company usually places restrictions on the stock that not only affect
when the recipient can purchase the stock, but also afford the corporate
issuer the right to repurchase the stock upon the occasion of certain stated
events." Typically, any restrictions that the company places on the stock
concern employment-related conditions, such as the duration of the recipi-
ent's employment with the company. 2 The employment-related restrictions
determine at what time the recipient may purchase the stock, or at what
time the company may exercise its repurchase right. 3 The time period in
which the stock vests in the recipient is a matter for negotiation between
the company and its employee and will vary from plan to plan.' 4 The stock
purchase agreement between the company and the employee, however, must
provide not only the stock purchase price, but also the conditions that an
employee must fulfill to purchase the stock and the stock repurchase price. 5
Department for criminal prosecution. Securities Act Release No 10214 [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. RP. 79,394 (Je. 11, 1973). Finally, a company that fails to register its
securities with the SEC may be liable in a civil action to the purchaser of the unregistered
securities for the price of the securities plus interest from the date of the sale. T. HAZEN,
supra, at § 7.2.
9. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text (discussing proposal for exemption of
small companies' equity incentive plans from security registration).
10. R. HAFr, supra note 2, at § 4.02.
11. Id. Examples of restrictions that companies usually place on stock issuances to their
employees include subjecting the stock to a repurchase right in the company should the
employee leave the company within a five year period after the company issues the stock to
the employee, and subjecting the stock to an automatic repurchase right in the company should
the company terminate the employee. Id. Companies adopt restrictions, such as the companies'
right to repurchase an employee's stock, to encourage the employee to work efficiently and
to give the employee an incentive to remain with the company. See C. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
LAW OF CoRPoRATioNs § 281 (3d ed. 1983) (examining theories behind companies' issuance of
restricted stock).
12. See C. HENN & J. aXANDER, supra note 11, at § 281 (examrining reasons why
companies issue restricted stock).
13. Id.
14. R. HAFr, supra note 2, at § 4.02; see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text
(discussing examples of restrictions that companies commonly place on restricted stock).
15. R. HAFT, supra note 2, at § 4.02. The stock repurchase agreement in the stock
purchase contract may provide a repurchase price for stock that has vested in the employee
that is different from what the employee originally paid for the stock. Id. Further, the company
may require that the employee place the stock in escrow prior to vesting, thus allowing the
employee to receive the stock out of escrow only after the employee has completed the stated
conditions. Id. Moreover, the company may retain additional rights to repurchase the stock,
such as a right of first refusal in appropriate circumstances. Id. Thus, the stock purchase
agreement could provide that the recipient must first allow the company an opportunity to
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Finally, restricted stock that a corporate issuer transfers to an employee
subjects the employee to a tax liability for the difference between the price
that the employee paid for the stock and the fair market value of the stock
on the date that the restrictions lapsed.
16
In addition to restricted stock plans, companies generally employ incen-
tive stock option plans ("ISOs"). 17 An ISO is a stock option plan that a
company offers to an employee as an incentive to work harder and more
efficiently.' 8 Most corporate issuers argue that providing ownership potential
to an employee increases the employee's efficiency because, upon receiving
an equity interest in the company, the employee has a personal stake in the
profitability of the company.' 9 The company must grant the ISO pursuant
to a plan that states the aggregate number of shares that the company may
issue, the employees who are eligible under the plan, and that the share-
holders of the company have approved the ISO within twelve months before
or after the company has adopted the ISO. ° The statutory time limit for
granting options under an ISO is ten years from the date the shareholders
of the company adopt the plan.2 ' The recipient of an ISO may not exercise
the option after the ten-year statutory period. 22 Further, the option price of
the ISO may not be less than the fair market value of the stock at the time
the company grants the ISO.? Finally, the amount of option stock under
repurchase the employee's restricted stock before the employee can sell the stock to an outside
party. Id.
16. Id. Section 83(a) of the Internal Revenue Code subjects the recipient of restricted
stock to a tax liability for any market appreciation of the stock when the restrictions lapsed
over what the recipient originally paid for the stock. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (1986). Section 83 of
the Revenue Code governs any stock issuance that a company makes to an employee in
connection with the employee's performance of services. Id. at § 83(e). Thus, under § 83(e),
an employee should include the appreciation of the employee's stock in the employee's gross
taxable income for the first taxable year in which the employee freely can transfer the
stock and the employee's stock is not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Id. at §
83(c)(1). Section 83 defines an employees stock as transferable when the employee's rights in
the stock are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Id. at § 83(c)(2). According to §
83, a substantial risk of forfeiture exists where a company conditions an employee's right in
stock upon the employee's future performance of services. Id. at § 83(a). The possibility of
forfeiture is substantial under § 83 if the employee does not satisfy the conditions that the
company places on the stock that the company issues to the employee. Id.; see. HAFr, supra
note 2, at § 4.0112] n.7 (discussing stock subject to substantial risk of forfeiture).
17. See R. HAr, supra note 2, § 4.03 (discussing incentive stock option plans).
18. Id.; see I.R.C. § 422A (1986) (delineating requirements with which company must
comply in adopting incentive stock option plans ("ISOs") to receive potentially favorable tax
consequences); see also infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing statutory require-
ments of ISOs).
19. See R. HAFr, supra note 2, at § 4.03 (discussing employee incentive stock option
plans).
20. See I.R.C. § 422A(b)(1) (1986) (providing statutory requirements for companies
instituting incentive stock option plans).
21. Id. at § 422A(b)(2) (1986).
22. Id. at § 422A(b)(3) (1986).
23. Id. at § 422A(b)(4) (1986).
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an ISO that a company issues to one employee must not exceed $100,000.24
A third type of option plan that small companies often utilize to
compensate their employees is a nonqualifying stock option plan ("NSO"). 2
NSOs are company stock option plans that do not afford the recipient
special tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 If the company
24. Id. at 422A(b)(7) (1986). The Internal Revenue Code provides that any recipient of
an ISO may not own more than 10% of the voting shares of his company's stock. Id. at
422A(b)(6). In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, Congress repealed the 60% deduction
for net capital gains that Congress provided for in the Internal Revenue Code before the 1986
amendments. See ALI-ABA Tax Reform Act of 1986 (volume II), at 892 (discussing impact
of Tax Reform Act on equity incentive plans). As a result, the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") taxes ISOs at ordinary income rates. Id. Congress' repeal of the capital gains deduction
in the Tax Reform Act, therefore, reduces the tax advantages of ISOs relative to other types
of equity incentives such as nonqualified stock options. Id.; see infra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text (discussing nonqualified stock options and tax consequences of nonqualified
stock options). Although the IRS continues to defer a recipient's recognition of the ISO as
income until the recipient exercises the ISO, the IRS will tax the ISO at ordinary income rates,
which are the same rates that apply to the income that the recipient would recognize upon
exercising a nonqualified stock option. ALI-ABA Tax Reform Act of 1986 (volume II), at
893; see infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing tax consequences of nonqualified
stock options). Moreover, upon the recipient's exercise of an ISO, the recipient must include
the difference between the option price and the fair market value of the stock as part of the
recipient's minimum tax base. ALI-ABA Tax Reform Act of 1986 (volume II), at 893. Congress
provides for a minimum tax rate of 21% to the recipient for the difference between the fair
market value of the stock when the recipient exercised the ISO and the ISOs option price. Id.
Should the recipient decide to sell the stock, however, Congress provides in the Tax Reform
Act that the IRS will tax any gain that the recipient receives on the sale at the ordinary
maximum tax rate for individuals. Id. In the Tax Reform Act,Congress does allow a recipient
of an ISO to credit against the recipient's regular tax liability the portion of the recipient's
minimum tax liability attributable to tax preferences that relate to deferred income. Id.
25. See R. HAT, supra note 2, at § 4.01[2] (discussing nonqualified stock option plans).
Companies often include with the companies' incentive and/or nonqualified stock options
stock appreciation rights ("SARs") affording the employee a method of realizing in cash or
securities the spread between the stock's fair market value and the stock's option price. Id.
The SAR holder, therefore, may obtain the fair market value increase of the holder's stock
without expending any additional funds. Id. Companies may grant an SAR wholly apart from
the companies' grant of any type of option. Id. When a company grants an SAR separately,
the SAR becomes a long-term incentive program for the holder giving the holder a form of
deferred compensation. Id. SARs that a company utilizes for deferred compensation involve
"phantom" stock rather than actual shares. Id. The company grants to the company's
employees units equivalent to stock, whose value equals the market value appreciation of the
company's stock from the date the employee acquires the stock to the settlement date. Id.
The settlement date is usually the employee's date of retirement or date of termination of
employment. Id. The company may pay the amount of appreciation to the employee as a
lump sum or in installments over a period of time. Id. See generally Herzel & Perlman, Stock
Appreciation Rights, 33 Bus. LAW. 749, 755-58 (1978) (discussing business aspects of stock
options and SARs).
26. R. HAFr, supra note 2, at § 4.01[2]. Section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code subjects
an employee to a tax liability for any property, including stock, that a company transfers to
the employee in connection with the employee's performance of services. I.R.C. § 83(a)(I)
(1986). The Internal Revenue Code provides that the employee is subject to a tax liability for
the difference between the purchase price of the property and the property's fair market value.
1134
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complies with the procedures set forth in the Treasury Regulations of the
Internal Revenue Code when the company institutes an equity incentive plan
using nonqualified stock options, the company is entitled to a business
deduction. 27 The Internal Revenue Code provides that stock that a company
transfers to an employee in connection with that employee's performance
of services becomes taxable as ordinary income to the employee only in the
year in which the stock that the recipient acquired in exercise of the NSO
is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture or becomes transfer-
able . 2 The Internal Revenue Code provides further that the company's
business deduction shall equal the amount that the employee includes as
income at either the time that the company grants the stock under the NSO
or the time the employee exercises his option to purchase the stock under
the NSO.
29
A final form of employee equity incentive that small companies often
utilize is convertible junior common stock.30 Junior common stock is a
separate class of common stock that a company's board of directors may
authorize."' Junior common stock possesses only a fraction of the rights,
preferences, and privileges of a company's regular common stock.32 For
example, while regular common stock entitles the holder to voting rights at
annual or special shareholders meetings, junior common stock does not
entitle the holder to any voting rights.33 Holders of junior common stock
receive the last claim to any dividends that a company may declare, and,
Id. The tax consequences for a recipient of a nonqualified stock option are the same as the
tax consequences for a recipient of a stock plan using restricted stock. R. HAFr, supra note
2, at § 4.01[2]. The Internal Revenue Code also provides that stock under an NSO becomes
taxable to the employee only in the year in which the stock becomes transferable and is no
longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (1986); see supra note 16
(discussing transferable stock and stock not subject to substantial risk of forfeiture).
27. See I.R.C. § 83(h) (1986) (providing for tax deduction by company for stock that
company grants to employee in connection with employee's performance of services).
28. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (1986); see supra note 16 (discussing Internal Revenue Code's rules
concerning when stock is transferable and not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture).
29. I.R.C. § 83(h) (1986). Section 83(h) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
when a company exchanges its stock for an employee's services, the company is entitled to
deduct from the company's gross taxable income an amount equal to the amount that the
employee values the stock in calculating the employee's gross taxable income. Id. The Code
provision allows the company to take the deduction only in the same year that the employee
includes the stock in the employee's gross taxable income. Id.
30. R. HArT, supra note 2, at § 4.04.
31. Id.
32. Id. Except as otherwise provided in a company's Articles of Incorporation, all of a
company's common shareholders enjoy equal rights. C. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note
11, at § 160. Among the rights that the common shareholders enjoy are the rights to receive
dividends, when, and if, the company's board of directors choose to declare dividends, the
right to the net assets of the company upon liquidation and after the company has satisfied
the claims of creditors, and the right to vote or participate in the control of the company. Id.
at § 160.
33. R. HART, supra note 2, at § 4.04; see supra note 32 (discussing rights and privileges
of holders of company's ordinary common stock).
1987] 1135
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therefore, receive shares that have the lowest dividend priority of the equity
holders of the company 4 Accordingly, a share of junior common stock
has a lesser -market value than an ordinary share of common stock." Upon
the occurrence of certain stated events that the company provides for in
the stock purchase agreement, however, the junior common stock automat-
ically converts into one share of the company's regular common stock2
6
Companies using junior common stock often tie the recipient's job per-
formance to the convertibility of the recipient's junior common stock to
regular common stock. 37 Thus, the recipient's attainment of specific pro-
duction quotas, earnings, or profit figures will warrant conversion of the
recipient's junior common stock to regular common stock under most
employee equity incentive plans utilizing convertible junior common stock.3"
Although small companies commonly use several forms of employee
equity incentive plans, the stock registration rules of the 1933 Act impede
a small company's effective use of employee equity incentives. 39 Under the
1933 Act a company must register all sales of the company's securities with
the SEC.40 Companies that issue stock under the typical employee equity
34. R. HAFT, supra note 2, at § 4.04.
35. See C. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at § 124 (because junior common
shareholders enjoy fewer rights and privileges than ordinary common shareholders, junior
common stock is less valuable).
36. R. HART, supra note 2, at § 4.04.
37. Id. Companies employing equity incentive plans using convertible common stock
often apply standards to determine the junior stock's convertibility that are similar to the
standards that companies implementing incentive plans with restricted stock use to gauge when
the restricted stock will vest in the employee. Id; see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text
(discussing conditions employee must fulfill to obtain company's restricted stock).
38. R. HAFr, supra note 2, at § 4.04. There exists little precedent under tax law for the
treatment of an employee's conversion of junior common stock to ordinary common stock.
Id. The Financial Accounting Standards Board of the United States "(FASB)" determined in
August 1984 that junior common stock was simply a method of compensating employees. Id.
The FASB required companies using junior .common stock to charge the stock against the
employees income. Id. Following the determinations of the FASB, the IRS taxes junior
common stock transactions under the same principles of § 83 as the IRS taxes a company's
stock plans employing restricted stock and NSOs. Id.; I.R.C. § 83 (1986); see supra note 16
and accompanying text (discussing tax consequences of restricted stock plans); notes 27-29 and
accompanying text (discussing tax consequences of NSOs).
39. Keller, supra note 2, at 156; see infra notes 92-125 and accompanying text (discussing
deficiencies of registration exemptions and "no sale" concept of 1933 Act).
40. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982) (prohibiting companies
from using instruments of interstate commerce or mails to sell unregistered securities). The
1933 Act requires companies distributing securities to file both a registration statement and a
prospectus with the SEC. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982). Congress
defines the term "security" comprehensively in the 1933 Act, encompassing nearly every
conceivable type of instrument with investment characteristics. See C. HEN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 11, at § 295 (discussing registration requirements of 1933 Act). See generally
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (defining term "security" as any note
or treasury stock or warrant or right to subscribe or purchase note, stock, or treasury stock).
Once a company decides to offer the company's securities to the public, the company, in
consultation with its financial advisors, will prepare a registration statement. T. HAZEN, supra
note 8, at § 3.1. The registration statement will fix the relative rights and preferences of the
1136
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incentive plan usually register the stock on a Form S-8. 41 The SEC has
designed Form S-8 to provide information to employees concerning the
particular equity incentive plan that the company is instituting and the type
of securities that the issuing company has chosen to use.42 The SEC also
requires that the Form S-8 contain certain information concerning the issuing
company's business operations, including the company's balance sheets and
audited financial statements. 43 Because employees are more familiar with
securities that the company will offer. Id. In preparing the registration statement, the company
must include information concerning the company's operations. Id. This aspect of the regis-
tration statement entails a thorough, factual investigation of all facets of the company, including
an examination of the activities of any subsidiary or affiliated company. Id. Additionally,
detailed disclosure requirements for registration statements mandate that a company include a
thorough analysis of the company's business operations, including a detailed description of all
divisions, departments, and accounting practices of the company. Id. Further, the disclosure
provisions require the company to disclose an analysis of the company's management structure
as well as a description or identification of all of the company's securities arrangements. Id.
In addition to the registration statement, the 1933 Act requires that the company provide the
recipient of the company's securities a prospectus before consummating any sale pursuant to
a registered offering. Securities Act of 1933 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1982). Among the
items that a company must include in the statutory prospectus are the company's balance
sheets and audited financial statements. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 3.2. The basic purpose
of the registration requirements of the 1933 Act and § 5's prohibitions and limitations on
permissible sales of securities is to assure that the investor has sufficient information to decide
intelligently whether to accept the company's securities offering. Id.
41. See FED. SaC. L. Ray. REP. (CCH) 7197-99 (July 13, 1983) (discussing disclosure
requirements of Form S-8). Form S-8 represents the disclosure form that a company would
utilize if registering securities offered to the company's employees pursuant to an option,
purchase, incentive, or bonus plan. 3A H. BLoomENTHAL, supra note 8, at § 7.14; see supra
notes 10-38 and accompanying text (discussing employee equity incentive plans.) To use
Form S-8, however, the registering company must have been a reporting company under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for at least 90 days and must have filed all reports that
the 1934 Act requires during the preceding twelve month period. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982); see 3A H. BLOOMENrHAL, supra note 8, at § 7.14
(discussing eligibility requirements of Form S-8); see also infra note 46 (discussing reporting
companies under 1934 Act).
42. See Securities Act Release No. 6188 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1945.1 (Feb. 1, 1980) (discussing application of registration requirements of 1933 Act to
employee equity incentive plans); see also supra note 40 (discussing registration requirements
of 1933 Act). The information concerning the plan that Form S-8 requires the company to
disclose includes the eligibility requirements for employees under the plan, the employee and
employer contributions to the plan, the plan's withdrawal provisions, and the company's
proposed administration of the plan. Securities Act Release No. 6188 [1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1945.1 n.182 (Feb. 1, 1980). Form S-8 also requires the registering
company to include audited statements of the financial condition of the plan and the income
and changes in equity of the plan for each of the last two fiscal years. Id. Further, Form S-
8 requires the registering company to include information concerning the rights and privileges
of the securities that the company is offering its employees. Id. at n.183. The information
concerning the securities includes the securities' dividend rights, voting rights, liquidation rights,
and redemption rights. Id.
43. Securities Act Release No. 6188 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. 1945.1
(Feb. 1, 1980). In addition to requiring the disclosure on Form S-8 of all audited financial
statements from the company's annual report, the SEC requires that the registering company
disclose other information on Form S-8. Id. The SEC also requires a registering company to
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their company than most outside investors, however, the disclosure require-
ments of Form S-8 are not as extensive as those of other registration
forms. 4 Notwithstanding the limited disclosure requirements of Form S-8,
compliance costs for a company using the form are nonetheless substantial. 41
Additionally, Form S-8 is not available to a company that is not already
public and subject to the disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.46 Small companies, therefore, must try to find a registration
exemption or struggle with the "no sale" concept of the 1933 Act in order
to implement an employee equity incentive plan.47
The 1933 Act provides a number of exemptions from the Act's regis-
tration requirements that a small company may utilize in implementing an
employee equity incentive plan.48 A common registration exemption of the
include in Form S-8 a summary of the company's operations for each of the five preceding
fiscal years, the market prices of the company's securities, the company's dividend policy, any
significant developments in the company in the past three years, a summary of the company's
business and management, and a list of any of the company's parent corporations. Id. at
n.184. The SEC, however, provides that the company may incorporate information concerning
the company's operations by reference to the company's annual report, which the company
also must furnish to the employee recipients of the company's equity incentive plans. Id.
44. Securities Act Release No. 6188 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. 1945.1
(Feb. 1, 1980).
45. See Duke, supra note 1, at 1432 (discussing costs and benefits of securities registration
under Form S-8). According to the responses of general counsels of more than 100 large
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange to questionnaires concerning securities
registration costs, the average cost of preparing the initial registration statement on Form S-8
is more than $18,000 combined with average annual updating costs of nearly $7,000. Id. at
n.12.
46. See 2 SEc. REG. (P-H) 4541 (May 4, 1983) (delineating rules for use of Form S-
8). According to the general instructions for using Form S-8, any company that seeks to
register stock pursuant to Form S-8 must be a "reporting company" under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
A "reporting company" under the 1934 Act is any company that has stock listed on a national
securities exchange, or, if a company's stock is traded on the over-the-counter markets, any
company with more than $3 million dollars in total assets and more than 500 shareholders. 3
H. BLoomENTHAL, supra note 8, at § 3.03[2]. Thus, only companies that the 1934 Act requires
to file periodic disclosure information may use Form S-8 to register the company's issuance
of stock under an employee equity incentive plan. Securities Act of 1934 Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R.
240.14a-3 (1986). Because of the unavailability of Form S-8 to companies with less than $3
million in total assets and less than 500 shareholders, most closely-held corporations must
undertake the lengthy and expensive registration process of the 1933 Act in implementing an
employee equity incentive plan. Keller, supra note 2, at 156. According to Keller, however,
the nonreporting small company is unlikely to undergo the cost and burden of full registration
necessary to institute an employee equity incentive plan. Id. at n.4. Keller also indicates that
most small companies do not even have the certified financial statements necessary to complete
registration even if the company desired to register the company's employee equity incentive
plan. Id.
47. See infra notes 48-125 and accompanying text (discussing 1933 Act's registration ex-
emptions applicable to employee equity incentives and 1933 Act's "no sale" concept).
48. See H. BLooMENTHAL, SEctnrrms LAW HANDBOOK § 7.02 (1985-86 ed.) (discussing
1933 Act's registration exemptions). The most significant registration exemptions that apply
to a small issuer of securities pursuant to an employee equity incentive plan are the "private"
offering exemption, conditional exemptions that the 1933 Act authorizes the SEC to adopt for
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1933 Act for small companies is the private offering exemption under section
4(2) of the 1933 Act. 49 Section 4(2) exempts from registration a company's
securities transactions that do not involve a public offering.50 In creating
this exemption from the 1933 Act's registration process, Congress neglected
to define the term "public offering," and the term's converse, "private
placement." 51 In 1953, however, the United States Supreme Court attempted
to clarify the prerequisites to a company's utilization of the private offering
exemption in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.5 2 In Ralston Purina, the Ralston
Purina Company had sold nearly $2 million of the company's treasury stock
to as many as 414 of the company's employees without registering the stock
offering with the SEC. 3 The SEC filed suit against Ralston Purina in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to enjoin
the company from offering any further shares of the company's common
stock to the company's employees without first registering the shares with
the SEC.14 The SEC contended that the legislative history of section 4(2),
as well as the commission's own administrative interpretation of the section,
established that the private offering exemption of section 4(2) required a
numerical test for determining when a securities offering becomes public. 5
The SEC maintained that a stock offering to'414 investors was too great
an offering to constitute a private placement under the SEC's numerical
test.16 Ralston Purina countered by arguing that because the company offered
the company's shares only to a limited number of the company's total
employees as a means of encouraging stock ownership among the company's
key employees, the company's stock offering represented a private offering
under section 4(2).
57
security issuances less than $5 million, the intrastate exemption, and the exemption for issuances
not involving a "sale" of securities. Id.; see infra notes 49-91 and accompanying text (discussing
common registration exemptions that small companies utilize in implementing employee equity
incentives); see also Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982) (requiring
registration of all securities); supra note 40 (discussing registration requirements of 1933 Act).
49. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1982) (exempting from
registration securities offerings that do not constitute a public sale of securities); see also infra
note 50 and accompanying text (discussing private placement exemption of § 4(2) of 1933
Act).
50. Id. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides that a company's securities issuance that
does not constitute a securities offering to the public is exempt from the registration require-
ments of the 1933 Act. Id.; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing registration
requirements of 1933 Act).
51. See Kessler, The Effect of the Securities Laws Upon Small Business, 28 PRAc. LAW.
11, 18 (1982) (examining small companies' use of 1933 Act's § 4(2) registration exemption in
companies' stock offerings to investors).
52. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
53. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 121 (1953); see C. HEin & J. ALEXAmDER,
supra note 11, at § 158 (defining treasury stock as stock that company has authorized and
issued, but has reacquired by either donation, purchase, conversion from, or forfeiture by
original holder).
54. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 119.
55. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 102 F. Supp. 964, 966-67 (E.D. Mo. 1952).
56. Id.
57. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 121-22.
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Both the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to which the SEC
appealed the district court's decision, accepted Ralston Purina's argument
concerning the applicability of section 4(2) to the company's employee stock
offering and dismissed the action.58 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
however, the Court reversed the determination of the two lower federal
courts 9 In resolving the issue of whether the registration exemption of
section 4(2) applied to Ralston Purina's employee stock purchase plan, the
Court rejected the arguments of both the SEC and the company that the
applicability of the exemption should focus exclusively on the number of
investors or types of investors that the plan included. 60 The Court provided
that a flexible test should determine the availability of the exemption.6' The
Court reasoned that the conceptual purpose underlying any securities reg-
istration exemption is that the individuals involved in an exempt transaction
do not need the protection of the 1933 Act.A2 Thus, the Court determined
that the threshold issue governing whether a particular stock offering is
private or public for purposes of securities registration centers on the relative
knowledge and sophistication of the individuals involved in the transaction.6
3
The Court concluded that the test of an individual's sophistication depends
on the factual question of whether the individual has access to the same
financial and operational information that the 1933 Act would require a
company to disclose to outside investors on the company's registration
statement. 4 Because Ralston Purina failed to show that the employees
involved in the company's stock plan had access to information that the
company would have disclosed through registration under the 1933 Act, the
Court held that Ralston Purina's stock purchase plan constituted a public
offering.65
58. See Ralston Purina, 102 F. Supp. at 970 (holding that Ralston Purnia's stock offering
was not public and dismissing action); Ralston Purina, 200 F.2d 85, 93 (affirming district
court's opinion).
59. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 127.
60. Id. The United States Supreme Court held in SEC v. Ralston Purina that while the
SEC could employ a numerical test in deciding when to investigate certain exemption claims,
the 1933 Act does not require the SEC to incorporate a numerical test in the commission's
rules governing the availability of the exemption for nonpublic offerings. Id. In short, the
Court held that the number of people involved in a company's stock issuance plan is only
one factor bearing on a determination of whether the offering is public or private. Id.
61. See id. at 125 (Court found no justification for imposing strict limits on private
offerings as matter of statutory interpretation).
62. Id. at 124-25.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Supreme court noted in Ralston Purina that employees are just as entitled
to the protection of the 1933 Act as the private investor. Id. at 126. Thus, the Court held
that § 4(2) of the 1933 Act does not deprive employees of the safeguards of the 1933 Act. Id.
65. Id. at 127. SEC v. Ralston Purina stands as controlling precedent regarding the
conceptual framework of the 1933 Act's private offering exemption. See Duke, supra note 1,
at 1438-40 (examining regulatory developments of 1933 Act after Ralston Purina). Since the
Ralston Purina decision, courts and the SEC have maintained that the availability of the
private offering exemption depends on whether every offeree in a particular securities trans-
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To provide additional certainty to the meaning and availability of the
private offering exemption to small issuers of securities, the SEC promul-
gated Regulation D.6 Regulation D consists of a set of six rules that provide
three exemptions from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.6 7
action has available the same information that the offeree otherwise could uncover through
the issuing company's registration statement. See, e.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1291
(4th Cir. 1978) (sale to single investor of two notes not exempt when court found that investor
did not have access to information that registration statement would have supplied to investor);
Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1977) (indicating that
issuer's disclosure and recipient's access to information are disjunctive requirements for
purposes of private placement exemption); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir.
1971) (defining sophistication for purposes of private placement exemption as "exceptional
business experience").
66. Donahue, Regulation D: A Primer for the Practitioner, 8 DEL. J. CoRp. LAw 495,
499 (1983). Under § 3(b) of the 1933 Act, the SEC has the statutory authority to add any
class of securities to those that Congress otherwise exempts in the 1933 Act if the SEC
determines that registering the securities is unnecessary for the protection of the parties involved
because of the small amount of securities involved in the securities offering. Securities Act of
1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982). Under § 3(b) of the 1933 Act the SEC only may
exempt securities of less than $5 million. Id.; see infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text
(discussing Regulation D).
67. Securities Act Release No. 6389 [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506) (1986). In March of 1982, the
SEC adopted Regulation D to provide additional exemptions from the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act. Id. Regulation D constitutes the SEC's response to public concern that prior
rules and regulations had imposed disproportionate financial and administrative burdens on
small issuers of securities. Id. These disproportionate financial and administrative burdens
have impeded the ability of small companies to raise capital. Id. According to the SEC, the
commission promulgated Regulation D to achieve three main goals. Id. The first goal that the
SEC sought to achieve through Regulation D was to simplify and clarify the existing limited
offering rules and regulations under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act. Id.; Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2),
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). The second of the SEC's goals was to eliminate unnecessary
restrictions and regulations that § 4(2) placed on small companies and enhance the attractiveness
of the § 4(2) exemption. Securities Act Release No. 6389 [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982); Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2)
(1982). The final goal that the SEC sought to achieve was to provide uniformity between state
and federal registration private offering exemptions to facilitate a company's capital formation.
Securities Act Release No. 6389 [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,106
(Mar. 8, 1982).
Regulation D consists of a set of six rules prefaced by seven preliminary notes. See 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (Preliminary Notes 1-7) (1986) (notifying corporate issuers relying on
Regulation D that provisions of Regulation D do not exclude issuers from adhering to other
statutory duties and obligations apart from Regulation D). Note I of Regulation D informs
issuers that although Regulation D offerings are exempt from the registration requirements of
the 1933 Act, Regulation D offerings are not exempt from the antifraud, civil liability, or
other provisions of the securities laws. Id. at Preliminary Note 1. Note 2 of Regulation D
emphasizes the issuer's obligation to comply with applicable state securities laws. Id. at
Preliminary Note 2. Note 3 stresses that an issuer's reliance on Regulation D does not preclude
the issuer from utilizing other statutory exemptions for small securities offerings and private
placements. Id. at Preliminary Note 3. Thus, even if the issuer fails to meet the requirements
of Regulation D, the issuer still may employ the private placement exemption of § 4(2) of the
1933 Act. Donahue, supra note 67, at 499; see supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text
(discussing private placement exemption of § 4(2) of 1933 Act). Note 4 of Regulation D
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Under Rule 504 of Regulation D, the SEC exempts a company's securities
offerings from registration if the total amount of the offering is less than
$500,000 during a twelve month period.6 8 The Rule 504 exemption contains
no limit on the number of investors involved.69 Furthermore, the Rule 504
exemption does not require disclosure statements or sophistication standards
for the investors involved in an offering.70 Rule 505 of Regulation D exempts
a company's stock offerings of up to $5 million during a twelve month
period. 7' The Rule 505 exemption allows a company to issue securities to
any number of accredited investors and up to thirty-five nonaccredited
provides that Regulation D is available only to the issuer of the securities and not to the
issuer's affiliates or to other persons for resale of the issuer's securities. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-
.506 (Preliminary Note 4). Note 5 of Regulation D states that an issuer may use Regulation
D for business combinations. Id. at Preliminary Note 5. The business combinations that the
SEC contemplates in Regulation D are an issuer's reclassification of the issuer's securities, a
statutory merger or consolidation of the issuer, and an issuer's transfer of assets. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (1986) (describing business combinations that SEC recognizes in 1933
Act's securities registration provisions). Note 6 of Regulation D warns issuers that mere
compliance with all of the regulation's technicalities will not allow the issuer to use the
regulation if the SEC discovers that compliance was part of the issuer's scheme to evade the
registration provisions of the 1933 Act. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (Preliminary Note 6). Note
7 of Regulation D states that issuer's who sell or offer securities outside of the United States
need not register the securities under the 1933 Act. Id. at Preliminary Note 7.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1986). Rule 504 of Regulation D provides that the Rule 504
exemption is available only to an issuer that is neither an investment company nor subject to
the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. Owens & Makohin, Small Business Eemptions
Under Regulation D, I SEc. REG. (P-H) 1123 (Jan. 10, 1985); see supra note 46 (discussing
companies subject to reporting requirements of 1934 Act). To take advantage of the Rule
504 exemption, a company's offer and sale of securities must conform to the terms and
conditions set out in Rules 501-503 of Regulation D. Owens & Makohin, supra, at 1 1123.
Rule 501 of Regulation D provides definitions of certain terms that the SEC uses in the
remainder of Regulation D. Id. For instance, Rule 501 defines the terms "affiliate," "aggregate
offering price," "issuer," and "executive officer" for purposes of the remainder of the
regulation. Id. Rule 502 states that the concept of integration applies to all offerings under
Regulation D. Id. The concept of integration generally requires that the combination of all
securities offerings, which may be technically separate, are part of the same securities offering
for purposes of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act. Id.; see infra note 96 (discussing
SEC's use of integration concept in securities registration). Rule 502, however, establishes a
six-month safe harbor respecting the integration concept. Owens & Makohin, supra, at 1123.
The six-month safe harbor provides that companies may sell securities either six months before
or six months after the companies' securities offering under Regulation D without encountering
the problem of integration. Id. Additionally, Rule 502 expressly prohibits a company's use of
general advertising or general solicitation in the offer and sale of securities exempt from
registration under Rule 504 of Regulation D. Id. Rule 503 of Regulation D sets forth
requirements for filing notices with the SEC of security sales that a company makes under
Regulation D. Id. Rule 503 requires a company to file a notice form with the SEC 15 days
after the company's first sale of securities under Regulation D, and no later than 30 days
after the company's last sale, and every six months between sales. Id.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 203.504 (1986).
70. See id. (discussing suitability or investment sophistication standards under Rule 504
of Regulation D); see also infra note 72 (discussing distinction between accredited and nonac-
credited investors).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1986). A company relying on the Rule 505 exemption of
Regulation D must not be an investment company, and must satisfy the terms and conditions
1142
EMPLOYEE EQUITY INCENTIVE PLANS
investors. 72 Rule 505 does not require that the nonaccredited investors satisfy
any sophistication standards. 71 Moreover, Rule 505 does not require that
the investors, accredited or nonaccredited, have the ability to bear the
economic risks of the investment. 74 Rule 505, however, does include infor-
mation requirements depending on the type of issuer and the type of investor
involved in the transaction. 75 Rule 506 of Regulation D, substantially similar
to Rule 505, contains no limitation on the type of corporate issuer that
may rely on the Rule's exemption or on the aggregate offering price of the
securities that the company may issue in an offering. 76 Like Rule 505,
Rule 506 limits to thirty-five the number of nonaccredited investors who
may participate in a company's securities offering under the Rule 506
exemption. 77 Rule 506 also includes disclosure requirements similar to the
of Rules 501-503 of Regulation D. See Owens & Makohin, supra note 68, at 1123 (discussing
Rule 505 of Regulation D); supra, note 68 (discussing Rules 501-503 of Regulation D).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1986). In calculating the number of purchases under
Rule 505 of Regulation D, the SEC excludes relatives of the management of the issuer,
including trusts and estates of the relatives of the issuer's management, as well as the issuer's
affiliated corporations and accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(e) (1986). Under Rule
501 of Regulation D, accredited investors include banks and insurance companies, business
development companies, small business investment companies, employee benefit plans, individ-
uals who purchase at least $150,000 worth of securities in one transaction when the purchase
price does.not exceed 20% of the individual's net worth, persons whose net worth exceeds $1
million, persons whose income exceeded $200,000 in each of the two preceding years and will
exceed $200,000 for the current year, and directors, executive officers or general partners of
the issuer. 17 C.F.R. 230.501(a)(1-8) (1986). The SEC counts a corporation, partnership, or
other business entity as one purchaser for purposes of the Rule 505 registration exemption,
unless promoters formed the entity for the specific purpose of investment. Id. If the entity is
an investment entity, the SEC will count each equity owner of the entity individually for
purposes of the purchaser limitation of Rule 505. Id.
73. Owens & Makohin, supra note 68, at 1123.
74. Id.
75. Id. Under Rule 505, if all of the purchasers of a company's securities are accredited,
the company does not need to disclose any financial information. Id.; see supra note 72
(discussing accredited investors under Regulation D). If/the purchasers include nonaccredited
investors, however, the type of information that the issuer must disclose to the nonaccredited
investors depends on whether the issuer is a reporting company under the 1934 Act. See Owens
& Makohin, supra note 68, at 1123 (discussing disclosure requirements for companies offering
securities to accredited and nonaccredited investors); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982); see supra note 46 (discussing reporting companies under the 1934
Act). Regardless of whether a purchaser is accredited or nonaccredited, Rule 505 requires the
reporting or nonreporting issuer to give each purchaser the opportunity to ask questions and
receive answers concerning the terms and conditions of the securities offering and to obtain
additional information that the issuer possesses or can acquire without unreasonable effort or
expense. Owens & Makohin, supra note 68, at 1123.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1986). Like Rules 504 and 505, Rule 506 requires companies
issuing securities under the Rule to comply with the terms and conditions of Rules 501-503 of
Regulation D. Id.; see Owens & Makohin, supra note 68, at 1123 (discussing applicability
of Regulation D exemptions for small business); supra note 68 (discussing Rules 501-503 of
Regulation D). Rule 506, however, is the only Rule under Regulation D that places no ceiling
on the dollar amount of an issuer's securities offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1986).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 203.506(b) (1986); see supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing
SEC's purchaser limitation of 35 nonaccredited investors in Rule 505 of Regulation D).
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requirements of Rule 505, which concern the corporate issuer's business
operations and financial condition.7 Unlike Rule 505, however, Rule
506 requires that nonaccredited investors satisfy sophistication standards."
Moreover, Rule 506 requires a corporate issuer to believe, immediately
prior to making any sale of securities, that each investor possesses sufficient
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to enable the
investor to evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective investment.8 0
In addition to the 1933 Act's registration exemptions for private place-
ments under section 4(2) and Regulation D of the Act, small companies
may take advantage of the intrastate registration exemption under section
3(a)(11) of the Act in implementing employee equity incentive plans. 8 In
order for a company to utilize the intrastate exemption, the company must
make all offers and sales of the company's securities to bona fide residents
of a single, appropriate jurisdiction.s2 The appropriate jurisdiction under
section 3(a)(1 1) is that state in which the company incorporates and conducts
business. 83 To determine the jurisdiction under section 3(a)(11) in which the
company conducts its primary business, the company must have its principal
place of business in the same jurisdiction in which the company plans to
use most of the proceeds of the company's securities offering. 4 Finally, for
78. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506'(1986). The SEC requires in Rule 506 that the corporate issuer
disclose to the investor the issuer's financial statements for the three fiscal years immediately
preceding the date of the securities offering. Id. The SEC also requires in Rule 506 that the
eorporate issuer disclose to the investor the issuer's balance sheets for the two fiscal years
prior to the securities offering. Id.; see Owens & Makohin, supra note 68, at 1123 (discussing
disclosure requirements of Rule 506); supra note 75 (discussing disclosure requirements of Rule
505).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1986); see Owens & Makohin, supra note 68, at 1123
(discussing sophistication standards under Rule 506); supra text accompanying notes 73-74
(discussing sophistication standards of Rule 505).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1986). The issuer's subjective determination of an investor's
sophistication in business and financial matters applies only to nonaccredited investors under
Rule 506. Owens & Makohin, supra note 68, at 1123. The issuer may accomplish its burden
of investigating the sophistication of the issuer's proposed investors through use of investor
questionnaires in which the investor discloses facts concerning the investor's education, financial
background, prior investments of similar nature, and other relevant information documenting
the investor's business knowledge and experience. Id. The SEC, however, does not provide a
standard for determining when the SEC will consider the issuer to have satisfied sufficiently
the issuer's burden of establishing the sophistication of an investor. Id.
81. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(1l), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982). Section 3(a)(l1) of
the 1933 Act exempts from registration any security that is part of an offering that the issuer
sells only to investors in the same state or territory. Id. To take advantage of § 3(a)(l1) the
issuer must be incorporated and have its principle place of business in the same state or
territory as the investors in the issuer's securities. Id.
82. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982); see H. BLoo1ATrHrA,
supra note 48, at § 7.10 (discussing requirements of intrastate exemption of 1933 Act).
83. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(l1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982); see H. BLooENTrArr ,
supra note 48, at § 7.10 (discussing requirements of intrastate exemption of 1933 Act).
84. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1986); see H. BLooMrNTHAL,
supra note 48, at § 7.10 (discussing requirements of intrastate exemption). An offering is not
1144
EMPLOYEE EQUITY INCENTIVE PLANS
securities offerings qualifying for an exemption pursuant to section 3(a)(1 1),
a shareholder's inadvertent resale of securities to a nonresident could destroy
the availability of the exemption for the entire securities offering that the
issuing company has undertaken.,"
Because section 3(a)(11) is not a detailed statutory provision, the SEC
promulgated Rule 147 as a "safe harbor" for the intrastate exemption. 86 In
Rule 147 the SEC defines the term "resident" for purposes of the intrastate
exemption and specifies numerical standards on which a company may rely
in determining whether the company satisfies the jurisdictional requirement
of the section 3(a)(11) exemption." Additionally, the SEC clarifies in Rule
147 when a recipient of stock issued in reliance on the intrastate exemption
may resell the stock to nonstate residents without rendering the exemption
unavailable to the company's stock offering. s In Rule 147, the SEC provides
a nine-month resale limitation period to gauge when a company's share-
exempt under the intrastate exemption when the issuer plans to use the proceeds of the offering
to finance the issuer's out-of-state ventures. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a)(11) (1982); see Kessler, supra note 51, at 15 (discussing requirements of intrastate
exemption). For example, a company seeking to utilize the intrastate exemption for its securities
offering could not use the proceeds of the offering to purchase out-of-state oil and gas interests,
or to make loans to out-of-state land developers and still claim the offering exempt under the
intrastate exemption. Id.
85. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11) (1986), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982); see T. HAZEN,
supra note 8, at § 4.12 (discussing securities resale under intrastate exemption).
86. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5450 (Jan. 7, 1974) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.147 (1986)); see L. Loss, FuNrm ENTALs OF SEcurxas REGULATION 375 (1983) (defining
"safe harbor" in securities law as guidelines that SEC adopts to provide objective standards
upon which companies may rely in interpreting statutory provision of 1933 Act). The SEC
frequently adopts "safe harbor" rules to provide objective standards upon which companies
may rely in implementing securities offering under a registration exemption of the 1933 Act.
L. Loss, supra, at 375. The SEC's "safe harbor" rule to a particular securities registration
exemption of the 1933 Act usually will provide more definite conditions for a company to
satisfy than Congress has provided for in the statutory language of the exemption provision.
Id.; see infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (SEC provides in Rule 147 definite residency,
conduct, and resale standards for companies to rely on in implementing securities offering
under intrastate offering exemption of 1933 Act).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1986). Under Rule 147, an individual's residence is the
individual's principal residence at the time a corporate issuer, relying on Rule 147, offers or
sells securities to the individual. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(d)(2) (1986). The SEC's residency test in
Rule 147 seems to limit each individual's residence to one state, thus eliminating vacation
homes as indicia of an individual's residence. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.12. In addition
to the investor's residency requirements, the SEC defines in Rule 147 when the SEC will
consider the corporate issuer a resident of a state. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(1) (1986). Under
rule 147, the SEC requires the corporate issuer to have its place of incorporation and its
principle place of business in the same state. Id. The SEC considers the issuer to have its
principle place of business in the state in which the issuer derives at least 80% of its gross
revenue per year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2)i) (1986). The SEC also consider the issuer to
have its principle place of business in the state in which the issuer has 80% of its assets within
the past fiscal year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2Xii) (1986).
88. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1986) (providing limitation for stock resales to nonres-
idents).
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holders may resell stock to nonresidents s9 The SEC assumes under Rule
147 that a securities offering made pursuant to the intrastate exemption has
ended nine months after the last sale that a company has made in reliance
on the exemption. 9° The SEC, therefore, allows shareholders who obtained
their stock in a principal offering pursuant to Rule 147 to resell their stock
to nonresidents after the nine month limitation period without affecting the
availability of the intrastate exemption for the company's principal offer-
ing.9' While the 1933 Act seems to provide a small company with numerous
registration exemptions from which to choose when implementing an em-
ployee equity incentive plan, none of the 1933 Act's exemptions satisfy the
precise circumstances of a small company's equity incentive plan with
sufficient certainty. 92 For instance, under the private offering exemption of
section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, the SEC requires that the recipients possess
the requisite knowledge and sophistication to warrant nonregistration under
the Act. 9 Unless the company restricts the recipients of the plan to top
89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1986).
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1986) (providing nine-month limitation period for stock
resales to nonresidents).
91. See id. (providing nine-month limitation period for stock resales to nonresidents). A
small company desiring to use the intrastate exemption may rely on either a general interpre-
tation of § 3(a)(11) or on Rule 147 in determining whether the company's securities offering
is exempt from registration under the 1933 Act. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 48, at § 7.10
(discussing availability of intrastate exemption and Rule 147 to securities issuers). Because of
its more detailed standards, Rule 147 provides greater certainty to a company desiring to
implement a securities offering under the intrastate exemption of the 1933 Act. Id. see supra
note 87 and accompanying text (discussing residency standards and conduct requirements of
Rule 147).
92. See Keller, supra note 2, at 156-57 (discussing deficienies of present federal securities
registration exemptions); see also infra notes 93-110 and accompanying text (discussing defi-
ciencies of securities registration exemptions for small companies' equity incentive plans).
93. Keller, supra note 2, at 156-57. Each recipient of securities under the private placement
exemption of the 1933 Act must have access to the types of information that full disclosure
under the 1933 Act requires. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.21; see supra notes 49-65 and
accompanying text (discussing private placement exemption). The issuer will not satisfy the
knowledge requirement under the private placement exemption unless the issuer provides each
potential recipient with access to the issuer's disclosure information. T. HAZEN, supra note 8,
at § 4.21. The issuer must provide the potential recipient with access to the disclosure
information even if the potential recipient decides not to participate in the securities offering
that the issuer conducts pursuant to the private placement exemption. Id.; see Doran v.
Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that plaintiff
offeree's knowledge and sophistication concerning facts underlying securities offering would
not save availability of private placement exemption if one of fellow offerees was not privy
to same information). The availability of the private placement exemption also depends on
the recipient's sophistication in financial matters generally. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.21.
The corporate issuer carries the burden of proving that all of the recipients of the company's
stock issued pursuant to the private placement exemption are sophisticated. Id. Accordingly,
one court denied a company the availability of the private placement exemption because the
company failed to show that all of the recipients of the company's stock received access to
information concerning the company that the recipients might have required in deciding whether
to purchase the company's securities. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Company of South Carolina,
Inc., 463 F.2d 137, 160-61 (5th Cir. 1972). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
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management or independently wealthy employees, however, corporate issuers
frequently have difficulty determining whether the recipients satisfy the
private offering exemption's sophistication requirements. 94 The corporate
issuer carries the burden of investigating and proving that all of the recipients
of equity incentives have access to all of the information that the company's
registration statement would disclose. 95 Additionally, the small corporate
issuer must incur the cost of communicating the existence of the employee
stock plan directly to the company's employees.96
Circuit has held that when the recipient of a company's securities lacks sufficient sophistication and
access to information, even an offering involving only one purchaser will not meet the requirements
of the private placement exemption. Lawler v. Gilliam 569 F.2d 1283, 1290-91 (4th Cir. 1978).
Recent cases concerning the sophistication requirements of the private offering exemption reveal that
a company relying on the private offering exemption may subject itself to a great deal of uncertainty
in instituting a securities offering pursuant to the exemption. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.21.
In addition to the sophistication guidelines that appear from the recent judicial decisions, the com-
pany also must recall the factors that the Supreme Court set out in SEEC v. Ralston Purina. Id.; see
SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (holding that individual's sophistication under private
offering exemption depends on whether individual has access to financial information that registra-
tion under 1933 Act would disclose); see also supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's holding in Ralston Purina). In evaluating the availability of the private
placement exemption, therefore, the courts and the SEC will scrutinize not only the number
and sophistication of the recipients of a company's stock, but also the recipient's access to
information, the relationship of the recipients to the company, the manner of the securities
offering, and the number of shares the company offers pursuant to the private placement
exemption. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.21.
94. See Keller, supra note 2, at 156 (discussing deficiency of private placement exemption
for small companies' equity incentive plans). Because companies often have difficulty deter-
mining the knowledge and sophistication of the potential recipients of the companies' stock,
companies commonly must risk stretching the concept of "private offering" to manipulate the
exemption to fit the companies' equity incentive plans. Id. The companies, therefore, risk
destroying the availability of the private placement exemption by extending the concept too
far. Id.
95. See T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.21 (discussing requirements and availability of
private placement exemption); supra note 93 (discussing companies' burden of proving that
recipients of companies' stock issued under private placement exemption are sophisticated).
96. See T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.21 (discussing disclosure requirements under
private placement exemption). In addition to the sophistication and disclosure requirements of
the private placement exemption, the integration doctrine poses problems for the small securities
issuer relying on the private placement exemption. Id. Under the integration doctrine, the SEC
will scrutinize closely securities offerings that may appear to be separate transactions to
determine whether the commission will treat the offerings as part of a single offering or as
two distinct transactions. Id. at § 4.13. Thus, the integration doctrine potentially operates to
combine two or more seemingly separate securities transactions into part of a single securities
offering. Id. In determining whether the integration doctrine will apply to a particular series
of securities offerings, the SEC considers several factors: whether the securities offerings are
part of a single financing plan; whether the offerings involve the same class of security;
whether the company makes the offerings at or about the same time; whether the company
receives the same consideration for the company's offering; and, whether the company makes
the offering for the same general purpose. Id. Regarding the private placement exemption, the
integration doctrine could destroy the availability of the exemption. Id. A recipient's down-
stream sale of securities, which the recipient obtained through a principle offering under the
private placement exemption, to a third party may relate back and destroy the exemption for
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Despite the SEC's attempt in Regulation D to clarify the uncertainty
and inconsistency of the private offering exemption, the registration exemp-
tions of Regulation D provide little comfort for the small company imple-
menting an employee equity incentive plan. 97 While the registration exemption
in Rule 504 of Regulation D removes the obligation of small companies to
file financial statements and simplifies the sophistication standards of the
recipients of the company's employee equity incentive, the $500,000 ceiling
that Rule 504 imposes on the company's securities offering effectively limits
the availability of equity plans. 9 The $500,000 limitation is especially
burdensome to small companies who are uncertain how to measure the
ceiling.Y9 Similar to the exemption in Rule 504, the exemption in Rule 505,
'the principle offering. Id. Because the third party purchaser may not qualify as a sophisticated
purchaser under the private placement exemption, the SEC may consider a downstream sale
to an unsophisticated third party within a short time to constitute part of the company's
principal securities offering under the private placement exemption. Id.; see supra note 93
(discussing sophistication standards of private placement exemption). By integrating the down-
stream sale with the principle offering, the SEC may not allow the company to use the private
placement exemption for the company's principal offering. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.13.
The SEC, therefore, may require the company to register all of the stock the company
originally sold pursuant to the private placement exemption. Id.
97. See Donahue, supra note 66, at 520 (discussing implications of Regulation D to small
securities issuers). Mark Donahue, an investment banker with Merrill Lynch's Capital Markets
Group, indicates that whether Regulation D will fulfill the SEC's intentions of creating
simplified registration exemptions for small securities issuers depends on how strictly the SEC
and the courts enforce the regulation's provisions. Id. The commentator contends that if the
SEC requires overly strict compliance with Regulation D, the commission could impede small
issuers' effective use of Regulation D's registration exemptions. Id. A small company consid-
ering a securities offering under Regulation D may hesitate to implement a securities offering
under Regulation D when the company realizes the potential liability the company could face
by failing to comply strictly with the regulation's technical and complex provisions. Id. The
company may decide that the risk is too great and not attempt to utilize Regulation D. Id.
The commentator recommends, therefore, that the SEC adopt a substantial compliance policy
in evaluating Regulation D transactions by small securities issuers. Id. The commentator argues
that the SEC's adoption of a substantial compliance policy would further the SEC's purpose
of allowing small companies to raise capital through limited securities offerings without forcing
the companies to comply with needlessly burdensome rules. Id.; see supra notes 66-80 and
accompanying text (discussing Regulation D).
98. Keller, supra note 2, at 157; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1986) (imposing
$500,000 limit on securities offerings under Rule 504 of Regulation D); supra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text (discussing Rule 504 of Regulation D).
99. Keller, supra note 2, at 157; see 17 C.F.R. § 203.504(b)(2)(i) (1986) (imposing
$500,000 maximum on securities offerings under Rule 504 of Regulation D). Any company
that is planning to offer securities under Rule 504 must determine what portion of the $500,000
maximum is available for the proposed offering. J. HicKs, Naw LIMITED OERINo EXEMPIOrS:
REGLATION D 149-50 (1982). Under Rule 504, the company must subtract from the maximum
amount of $500,000 the aggregate offering price of all securities that the company sold within
one year prior to the proposed offering. Id. at 150. The company must diminish the available
maximum amount by the aggregate offering price of securities that the company previously
has offered in reliance on any exemption under § 3(b) of the 1933 Act, which include offerings
under Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D. Id.; Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. §
77c(b) (1982). Rule 504, however, does not explain how the company should value securities
1148
EMPLOYEE EQUITY INCENTIVE PLANS
which limits a company's securities offering to $5 million, does not impose
a sophistication requirement on the equity plan recipients. m The Rule 505
exemption, however, limits the number of nonaccredited investors who may
participate in the plan to thirty-five and requires disclosure of detailed
information comparable to the registration materials that the 1933 Act
requires.10' Thus, companies relying on the Rule 505 exemption gain no real
advantage because Rule 505 requires the company to undertake the trouble
and expense of preparing extensive disclosure materials for the benefit of
that the company proposes to offer pursuant to the Rule 504 exemption in calculating the
amount of securities that the company may sell. J. HICKS, supra, at 145-46. Rule 504
incorporates Rule 501's definition of "aggregate offering price," which provides the basis for
making the required calculation. Id. at 146; see supra note 68 (discussing Rule 504's incor-
poration of Rules 501-503 of Regulation D). Rule 501(c) contemplates several types of
transactions to assist a company that is planning to offer securities under rule 504. J. HICKS,
supra, at 61; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(c) (1986). One securities transaction that Rule 501(c)
recognizes as pertinent to employee equity incentive plans is a company's offering of securities
in exchange for the recipient's services. 17 C.F.R. § 230.510(c) (1986). Under Rule 501(c), the
company must value the services according to the fair market value of the services as determined
by "an accepted standard." J. HciCs, supra, at 64; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(c) (1986). Rule 501's
vague calculation method for valuing a recipient's services as consideration for a company's
stock offers little comfort to the company in determining the aggregate offering amount of
the company's stock issued under Rule 504. J. HICKS, supra, at 64. Companies instituting
securities offerings under Rule 504 of Regulation D to employees in exchange for services,
therefore, often have no set standard for placing a value on the employee's services to
determine whether the company's securities offering to the employees exceeds the $500,000
ceiling of Rule 504. Id.
In addition to the valuation problem, the integration doctrine also affects a company's
securities offering under Rule 504. T. HtzEN, supra note 8, at § 4.19. The SEC will use the
same five factor test that the commission employs in evaluating offerings pursuant to the
private placement exemption to determine whether the company's securities offering is a single
securities issue and qualifies under the $500,000 ceiling of Rule 504. Id.; see supra note 96
(discussing integration doctrine and five-factor test for determining whether SEC will integrate
offerings). Thus, the SEC could integrate a company's securities offering to outside investors
with the company's principal offering to the company's employees under Rule 504, conceivably
resulting in an aggregate securities offering exceeding $500,000. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at §
4.19. The integration of an outside offering with the principal offering to the company's
employees, therefore, could destroy the availability of the Rule 504 exemption to the principle
securities offering. Id.
100. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1986); Keller, supra note 2, at 157; see supra notes 71-75 and
accompanying text (discussing Rule 505 of Regulation D).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1986); see Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing disadvantages
of registration exemption of Rule 505 of Regulation D). The disclosure obligation of Rule 505
that requires a company to provide potential purchasers with the company's audited financial
statements is particularly burdensome to small companies that often have had no previous
audited financial statements. J. HciCs, supra note 99, at 231; see supra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text (discussing Rule 505's disclosure requirements and nonaccredited purchaser
limitation). The integration doctrine also applies to stock offerings that a company institutes
under Rule 505. T. HAzEN, supra note 8, at § 4.18. The SEC uses the same five factor test
that the commission employs in evaluating stock offerings under the private placement
exemption and Rule 504 to determine both the number of nonaccredited purchasers involved
in a Rule 505 securities offering and the $5 million maximum that Rule 505 imposes. H.
BtooM NTAnL, supra note 48, at § 4.05[7]; see supra notes 96 & 99 (discussing effect of
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the company's employees. 0 2 Finally, the exemption contained in Rule 506
also is unsuitable to the small securities issuer because the exemption limits
the number of nonaccredited investors to thirty-five, and requires the
company to furnish information as extensive as the registration materials
that the 1933 Act requires. 03 Additionally, companies often have difficulty
proving that the employees participating in the equity plan have the knowl-
edge and experience to make an intelligent purchase decision as Rule 506
requires. 04
While the intrastate offering exemption under section 3(a)(l1) of the
1933 Act also is available for equity incentive plans for small companies,
compliance with the requirements of the exemption is often difficult.,05 The
intrastate exemption is not available for companies with employees living
in more than one state unless the company restricts the plan only to the
employees who reside in the state in which the company incorporated and
has its principle place of business. 0 6 Additionally, Rule 147, which the SEC
adopted as a safe harbor for the intrastate exemption, contains impediments
integration doctrine on securities offerings under private placement exemption and Rule 504);
note 72 and accompanying text (discussing accredited and nonaccredited purchasers).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1986); see Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing deficiencies
of Rule 505).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1986); see Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing deficiencies
of Rule 506 for equity incentive plans for small companies); see also supra notes 77-80 and
accompanying text (discussing Rule 506's nonaccredited investor standards and disclosure
requirements). Similar to the criticisms of the disclosure obligations of Rule 505, small
companies attempting to rely on the registration exemption of Rule 506 will have difficulty
satisfying the Rule's mandate that a company supply all of the potential purchasers with
audited financial statements. J. HicKs, supra note 99, at 231; see supra note 101 (discussing
deficiencies with disclosure requirement of Rule 505 for small companies).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1986); see Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing deficiencies
in Rule 506 registration exemption for small security issuers); see also supra notes 78-80
(discussing Rule 506's requirement that companies relying on Rule show that nonaccredited
investors have access to same information that full disclosure would provide to investor). The
integration doctrine and the five-factor test that the SEC employs in evaluating offerings under
the private placement exemption and the other registration exemptions under Regulation D
also apply to securities offerings under Rule 506. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.22; see supra
notes 96, 99 & 101 (discussing integration doctrine and SEC's five-factor test for determining
whether integration will apply to particular securities offering under either private placement
exemption, Rule 504, or Rule 505). The SEC primarily uses the five-factor integration test to
evaluate the number of nonaccredited purchasers involved in a securities offering under Rule
506. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.22.
105. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982); see Keller, supra
note 2, at 157 (discussing limitations of intrastate exemption for small companies instituting
equity incentive plans); see also supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing require-
ments of intrastate registration exemption).
106. See Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing deficiency of intrastate exemption to
small securities issuers). Under the intrastate exemption of § 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act, not
only all purchasers but all offerees of a particular securities offering must be residents within
a single state. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.12; Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(l1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(11) (1982); see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of
intrastate registration exemption). In addition to the limitation on the potential number of
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to a company relying on the Rule.'°7 Most notably, the nine-month holding
period that Rule 147 provides does not commence until the company
completes the entire securities offering.108 The company will not complete
its offering under an employee equity incentive plan until the employees
exercise all of the options under the offering, which often does not occur
until several years after the company originally implements the employee
equity incentive plan.'09 Thus, an employee probably will not be able to
resell the stock that the employee received under the equity incentive for
several years, placing the employee at a potential liquidity disadvantage. 10
Aside from the 1933 Act's specific registration exemptions for a secu-
rities offering, a small company may attempt to avoid registration under
the 1933 Act by manipulating the company's employee equity incentive plan
participants in a securities offering under the intrastate exemption, the exemption's residency
requirements for the corporate issuer often impede a company's effective use of the exemption.
T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.12; see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing
intrastate exemption's residency requirements for corporate issuers). The exemption's corporate
residency requirements necessarily eliminate the vast number of companies that, while doing
business in one state, select some other jurisdiction such as Delaware in which to incorporate
to take advantage of the latter state's more attractive corporate laws. T. HAZEN, supra note
8, at § 4.12. Futhermore, even if the company and the purchasers and offerees participating
in the securities offering satisfy the intrastate exemption's residency requirements, the company's
subsequent use of the proceeds of the offering in an out-of-state venture could destroy the
availability of the exemption for the offering. Id.; see SEC v. McDonald Investment Co., 343
F.Supp. 343, 346-47 (D.Minn. 1972) (holding that Minnesota corporation's securities offering
was not exempt under the intrastate exemption because value of corporation's securities
depended on success of corporation's out-of-state land developments). Thus, the intrastate
exemption's application is questionable for any company with out-of-state operations because
the SEC could attribute proceeds from an offering pursuant to the exemption to the out-of-
state portion of the business. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.12. Additionally, the integration
doctrine affects the availability of the intrastate exemption and operates to determine whether
all of the participants in the securities offering pursuant to the exemption satisfy the exemption's
requirements. Id.; see supra note 96 (discussing integration doctrine).
107. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1986); see H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 48, at § 7.10 (discussing
deficiencies of Rule 147); see also supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (discussing
requirements of Rule 147).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1986).
109. See Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (indicating practical ineffectiveness of Rule 147 for
employee equity incentive plans); see also H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 48, at § 7.10 (discussing
deficiencies of Rule 147).
110. See H. BLOOMENTMHU, supra note 48, at § 7.10 (discussing deficiencies of Rule 147).
As with the statutory intrastate exemption of § 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act, the integration
doctrine also applies to offerings under Rule 147. T. HAZEN, supra note 8, at § 4.12. The
SEC uses the five-factor integration test to determine whether an offering conforms to the
residency and conduct requirements of Rule 147. Id.; see supra note 96 (discussing five-factor
integration test); see also note 87 and accompanying text (discussing residency and conduct
requirements of Rule L47). Rule 147 expressly adopts the five-factor integration test and
indicates that any one of the factors can determine the availability of Rule 147 to the corporate
issuer in a securities offering. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (preliminary note) (expressly adopting
SEC's five-factor integration test).
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to fall within the "no sale" concept of the 1933 Act."' Section 2(3) of the
1933 Act defines a "sale" of securities as a company's disposition for value
of a security or grant of interest in a security." 2 Unless a securities
transaction represents a sale under the 1933 Act, the Act does not require
that the corporate issuer register the securities."' While the definition of
"sale" under section 2(3) clearly includes a company's issuance of the
company's stock for cash consideration, section 2(3) implies that a com-
pany's grant of stock to the company's employee without requiring the
employee to pay for the security would not constitute a "sale. ' " 4 Thus, a
company's grant of stock to an employee would be exempt from the 1933
Act's registration requirements.' 5 In fact, the SEC has adopted the view
that certain employee stock purchase plans do not constitute a sale of
securities under the 1933 Act.
116
The SEC has instituted a series of guidelines to determine when a
company's employee stock plan does not qualify as a sale under the 1933
Act. "7 First, the SEC requires the company to announce the existence of
the plan by communicating directly the details of the plan to each of the
company's employees."' Next, the employer may make payroll deductions
for the plan only if the employees participating in the plan have requested
the deduction." 9 Finally, the SEC requires the company to pay the expense
of the payroll deductions and reasonable brokerage and bookkeeping fees. 20
Any deviation from the above standards could render the securities trans-
action a sale under the 1933 Act and requires the company to register the
111. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982); see 3 H. BLooMaHTaL,
supra note 8, at § 2.07[6] (discussing employee stock bonus plan and "no sale" theory of
1933 Act).
112. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982).
113. Id.
114. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982); see 3 H. BLOOMENTRAL,
supra note 8, at § 2.07[6] (discussing "no sale" concept of 1933 Act). In many equity incentive
plans, the recipient employee makes no monetary investment. H. BLooMEN-m , supra note 8,
at § 2.07[6]. Issuing companies, therefore, contend that no sale of securities occurs in the
context of employee equity incentive plans. Id.; see supra notes 10-38 and accompanying text
(discussing common equity incentive plans for small companies).
115. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, at § 2.07[61; see supra note 40 and accompanying
text (discussing 1933 Act's registration requirements).
116. Securities Act Release No. 6188 [1980 Transfer Binder] 1 F D. SEC. L. REP 1945.1
(Feb. 1, 1980). The SEC does not consider stock bonus plans, under which a company awards
shares of its stock to employees at no direct cost to the employees, to constitute a sale of
securities under the 1933 Act. Id. The SEC does not require companies to register the securities
that the company grants under a stock bonus plan because employees in almost every instance
would decide to participate in the plan if given the opportunity. Id. Registration of bonus
plans, therefore, would serve no practical purpose. Id. The SEC's position concerning employee
bonus plans as not constituting a sale of securities applies only to bonus plans that the
company makes available to a relatively broad class of employees. Id. at n.84.
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securities offering. ' 2 Despite the broad guidelines that the SEC has instituted
regarding the "no sale" concept, however, the SEC recently has commented
that the commission considers stock offerings that a company awards to an
employee pursuant to an individual employment arrangement to constitute
a sale under the 1933 Act."-' The SEC seems to include most equity incentive
plans in the Commission's determination of individual employment arrange-
ments subject to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act."2- Thus, the
SEC seems to consider the securities offerings that the company grants
pursuant to an equity incentive as sales of securities. 2 4 Given the SEC's
recent attitude toward equity incentive plans as constituting sales of secu-
rities, therefore, the present availability of the no sale exemption for
employee equity incentive plans is uncertain. 125
Because of the deficiencies of the 1933 Act's registration exemptions
and the "no sale" concept that apply to employee equity incentive plans,
the SEC should adopt a specific registration exemption for small companies'
employee equity incentive plans. 126 To provide a possible framework for
this exemption, the SEC should treat equity incentive plans, which are
primarily compensatory in nature, differently from other stock purchase
plans that companies ordinarily employ to generate additional operating
capital."27 The SEC should adopt a rule to exempt from the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act a company's compensatory securities offering
to its employees, advisors, and consultants in an aggregate amount up to
$5 million.- 8 Further, the SEC should tailor the exemption to apply only
to companies that are not reporting companies under the 1934 Act and are
121. Id.
122. Securities Act Release No. 6188 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
(Feb. 1, 1980) 1945.1, n.84.
123. See id. (discussing SEC's recent comments concerning securities offerings under
individual employment agreements as sales of securities).
124. Id.; see supra notes 10-38 and accompanying text (discussing common equity incentive
plans for small companies).
125. See Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing availability of 1933 Act's "no sale"
concept to small companies instituting employee equity incentive plans).
126. See 1986 SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation 33
(Jan. 1987) [hereinafter 1986 SEC Government-Business Forum] (recommending that SEC
adopt employee benefit exemption); see also Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (recommending that
SEC exempt from registration equity incentive plans for small companies); Duke, supra note
1, at 1446-48 (recommending that SEC exempt from registration companies' employee stock
compensation plans); supra notes 10-38 and accompanying text (discussing common equity
incentive plans for small companies).
127. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between compensatory
stock purchase plans and investment-oriented stock purchase plans).
128. See 1986 SEC Government-Business Forum, supra note 126, at 33 (discussing proposal
for registration exemption for small company's equity incentive plans). The SEC could adopt
a registration exemption for small companies' equity incentive plans under the commission's
statutory authority to adopt registration exemptions for securities offerings up to $5 million.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982) (allowing SEC to adopt registration
exemptions for securities issuances of less than $5 million according to commission's discretion).
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ineligible to use Form S-8.129 The SEC should limit the availability of the
employee equity exemption to only nonreporting companies to prevent larger
companies, which have the ability to absorb registration costs under Form
S-8, from circumventing the 1933 Act's registration requirements. 30 By
limiting the proposed equity incentive exemption to companies ineligible to
use Form S-8, the SEC will help guarantee that only those companies that
qualify for the exemption will be able to take advantage of the less stringent
disclosure requirements that the exemption will afford.' 3 ' Additionally, by
limiting the amount of securities that a company can issue under the
proposed exemption to $5 million or less annually, the SEC will help ensure
that the proposed exemption will be attractive only to small companies
instituting employee equity incentive plans. 32 By imposing limitations on
both the types of companies that can take advantage of the exemption and
the amount of securities that the eligible companies can issue under the
exemption, the SEC successfully could free small companies implementing
employee equity incentive plans from the present, burdensome registration
requirements under the 1933 Act and guard against potential abuse of the
exemption by larger companies.
33
Currently, in order for a small company to issue securities under an
employee equity incentive plan to attract and retain key employees, the
company must either register the securities with the SEC or attempt to find
an appropriate registration exemption. 34 Because a registered offering is
both costly and time consuming, registering stock with the SEC is not the
most efficient or practical way to implement an equity incentive plan. 35
Futhermore, the present registration exemptions under the 1933 Act severely
limit both the number and types of employees to whom the company may
129. See 1986 SEC Government-Business Forum, supra note 126, at 33 (discussing proposal
for registration exemption for employee benefit plans); Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (recom-
mending that SEC limit availability of employee equity registration exemption); see also supra
note 46 and accompanying text (discussing reporting companies under 1934 Act); notes 41-47
and accompanying text (discussing Form S-8 and companies entitled to use Form S-8).
130. See 1986 SEC Government-Business Forum, supra note 126, at 33 (discussing extent
and availability of proposed exemption for employee benefit plans).
131. Id.; see Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (recommending that SEC limit availability of
employee equity incentive exemption to nonreporting companies under 1934 Act); see also
supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing nonreporting companies under 1934 Act).
132. See 1986 SEC Government-Business Forum, supra note 126, at 33 (recommending
that SEC limit aggregate amount of securities that company can offer under proposed employee
benefit exemption).
133. Id.; see Keller, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing limitations that SEC should include
in adopting equity incentive registration exemption to help guard against larger companies
abusing less stringent disclosure requirements).
134. See supra notes 40 & 48-91 and accompanying text (discussing 1933 Act's registration
requirements and registration exemptions); see also notes 10-38 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing common equity incentive plans for small companies).
135. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing high cost of securities registra-
tion); see also notes 48-91 and accompanying text (discussing registration requirements of 1933
Act); notes 111-25 (discussing 1933 Act's "no sale" concept).
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sell its stock and the total dollar amount of stock that the company may
offer its employees under an equity incentive plan.3 6 The special, compen-
satory nature of equity incentive plans suggests that the SEC should permit
small companies to issue stock to the companies' employees as a form of
compensation without either incurring the high cost of registration or
needlessly limiting the offering by dollar amount or number of employees.
37
By adopting a registration exemption for employee equity incentive plans,
the SEC significantly will aid small companies in their struggle to attract
and compensate key employees while remaining economically competitive.
DAVID B. WiLKs
136. See supra notes 48-91 and accompanying text (discussing present registration exemp-
tions applicable to small companies' equity incentive plans); notes 92-125 and accompanying
text (discussing deficiencies of current registration exemptions and "no sale" concept of 1933
Act).
137. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing primarily compensatory nature
of equity incentive plans).
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